A new proposal from VPN.com is drawing attention across the internet governance community. The company’s CEO, Michael Gargiulo, argues that global internet infrastructure could act as a diplomatic pressure tool. His message is blunt. Governments that weaponize the internet against citizens should face consequences within the systems that allow their national domains to operate.
The idea centers on country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs). A ccTLD is the two-letter domain extension tied to a country, such as .us for the United States or .uk for the United Kingdom. These domain extensions exist within the global Domain Name System (DNS), the infrastructure that translates domain names into internet addresses.
Gargiulo believes this infrastructure should not remain neutral if regimes use digital systems to silence speech or enable violence.
“In 2026 the message should be simple,” Gargiulo said. “Stop H.A.T.E through diplomacy and global internet access.”
The acronym H.A.T.E refers to Human rights abuse, Aggression, Terror sponsorship, and Enforcement of censorship. Gargiulo argues that governments responsible for those actions should not receive unrestricted control of national domain infrastructure.
A Proposal Called “Internet Diplomacy”
Gargiulo’s proposal introduces what he calls Internet Diplomacy. The concept treats the global domain name system as a diplomatic pressure mechanism. Instead of sanctions, military escalation, or trade retaliation, the pressure would appear inside the digital infrastructure countries rely on to operate online.
The plan outlines a structured review process.
Neutral Review Panel
The first step involves creating a neutral international panel. This group would evaluate complaints tied to digital censorship, cyber aggression, or human rights violations connected to internet infrastructure.
The panel would examine evidence case by case. Each case would focus on how governments use their domain systems or root-zone privileges.
Graduated Consequences
The proposal suggests a staged response. Early stages would include warnings and oversight. Later stages could involve temporary restrictions tied to a country’s ccTLD privileges.
This approach mirrors enforcement structures already used within the domain industry. Trademark disputes, copyright complaints, and domain abuse cases already move through structured review processes.
Gargiulo argues the same concept could apply to governments that misuse the internet.
Transparent Reporting
The proposal also calls for public reporting. Decisions would appear in a transparent record explaining what actions occurred and why.
That transparency matters. Internet governance groups already operate through policy frameworks. Public documentation helps preserve trust in those systems.
Internet Infrastructure Already Carries Global Influence
For people unfamiliar with internet governance, the proposal may sound unusual. Yet the domain name system already contains mechanisms that influence global behavior.
Organizations such as ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) manage policies affecting the root zone. The root zone functions as the central directory for domain extensions across the internet.
When a domain extension appears in the root zone, it becomes reachable worldwide.
When it disappears, access disappears as well.
This technical structure gives internet governance organizations quiet influence over digital infrastructure used by governments, corporations, and citizens.
Gargiulo’s argument is that this influence should not remain passive when the same infrastructure supports censorship or state-driven cyber activity.
VPN.com Has Raised Similar Concerns Before
The company’s position did not appear overnight.
VPN.com has previously called attention to internet governance issues tied to censorship and digital control. In 2019 the company urged action involving Iranian domain infrastructure. The request pushed regulators to examine how national domain systems intersect with political actions.
The company continued raising similar concerns earlier in 2026. Gargiulo called for a review of ccTLD policies after censorship disputes tied to global social media platforms.
VPN.com also supported public debate around free speech conflicts involving X, the social network owned by Elon Musk, during disputes involving Brazil.
Those actions show a pattern. The company repeatedly speaks about digital infrastructure as a political and social influence point.
Domain Infrastructure Is Not Just Technical Plumbing
Many people treat domain systems as technical plumbing. They type a web address. A browser loads a page. End of story.
Professionals who work with domains know the picture looks different.
The Domain Name System (DNS) acts as a global directory. It maps domain names to IP addresses that connect users to websites, applications, and services. Control over a domain extension gives governments influence over how their national online identity functions.
That influence carries economic weight as well.
Businesses rely on domains for commerce. Brands rely on domains for trust. Citizens rely on domains for information access.
If a government manipulates those systems for censorship or surveillance, the internet becomes a control mechanism instead of an open communication network.
Gargiulo argues that internet governance should recognize that risk.
Digital Identity, Brands, and the Domain Economy
The debate also intersects with the domain name economy.
VPN.com operates a brokerage platform that connects buyers and sellers of premium domain names. Premium domains function as digital property. They hold brand value, search visibility, and credibility online.
The company regularly handles acquisition requests for high-value domains.
Those transactions illustrate a broader point.
Domain infrastructure supports global commerce. The same infrastructure also supports national identity on the internet.
Gargiulo’s proposal links those two ideas. If digital identity systems matter for global business, they also matter for diplomacy and policy.
A Debate That Will Likely Continue
The proposal raises obvious questions.
Who decides when a government crosses the line?
What standards determine censorship or cyber aggression?
How would internet governance groups enforce penalties without politicizing infrastructure?
Those questions will likely spark debate inside policy circles.
Still, Gargiulo’s argument lands on a simple point.
Digital systems already shape geopolitics. Ignoring that influence does not make it disappear.
Internet infrastructure already affects economies, communication, and public discourse across borders. Treating it as a diplomatic instrument may sound radical today. Ten years from now, it may sound obvious.
The broader takeaway is clear. The internet is no longer just a technical network. It has become a global system of identity, commerce, and influence. Policies governing that system will increasingly look like foreign policy discussions, even if they originate inside technical standards bodies.
Whether regulators embrace the concept of Internet Diplomacy remains uncertain. The conversation has started. And once conversations like this begin inside the internet governance community, they rarely disappear quietly.